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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
H. Alston Johnson*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

As was the case in the 1985 Regular Session of the Louisiana
Legislature, the legislative changes in the Workers' Compensation Act
(the "Act") were minor indeed. For the sake of completeness, they are
contained in the margin, but no amendment is of such significance as
to merit textual discussion.'
JURISPRUDENCE

Early Interpretationsof New Disability Standards
Probably the most interesting developments during this term were
the early interpretations of the more rigid standards for disability enacted
by the 1983 amendments to the Act. As noted in earlier discussions in
this forum, the ingenuity of the judiciary in reaching desired conclusions
should not be underestimated. Some members of the judiciary might
have felt that the revised standards for disability, especially with respect
to total and permanent disability, might be too slanted toward the
employer. There appears to have been an effort in a few cases to even
up the balance somewhat.
For example, in Brown v. Georgia Casualty & Surety, 2 the court
recognized that the new standard with respect to total and permanent
disability prevented it from reaching a conclusion that the claimant was
so disabled, but it rejected the argument that the same standard ought
to apply by implication to a finding of temporary total disability. The
court held that there had been no change in the standard with respect
to temporary total disability, and thus a claimant who could not meet
the more rigid standard for permanent disability might nonetheless be
entitled to temporary disability benefits under a lesser standard. In the
end, such an interpretation will probably be troublesome, since there
will be pressure from some quarters to retain an individual in a "tem-
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1986 La. Acts No. 831 specifically authorizes the release of certain medical records

to the employee or his representative; and with his permission, to the employer or the

carrier.
2. 490 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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porary" status when he really should be considered in a "permanent"
status, whether total or partial. Moreover, there ought to be little or
no difference between the standard of proof with respect to such matters,
since the distinction is largely a medical one based upon whether medical
stability has been achieved.
There is a similar leniency in Bellard v. Commercial Union Insurance
Co.' The claimant, a carpenter's helper, suffered a rather serious injury
to the index and middle fingers of his left hand on the job. Ultimately,
these two fingers were amputated below the midjoint. The ring finger
on the same hand was already practically useless due to an earlier football
injury. The appellate court specifically noted the stringency of the 1983
amendments, but concluded that it could not hold that the trial judge's
determination of total and permanent disability under those standards
was erroneous. While there is an insufficient recitation of the facts in
the opinion to reach a firm conclusion, it would appear that the more
rigid standards are barely satisfied.
One other interesting aspect of the decision should be noted. The
appellate court, in supporting its decision affirming the trial judge's
conclusions, noted that the defendant did not offer any "contradictory
evidence, such as vocational rehabilitation specialists," ' 4 to demonstrate
that the plaintiff could engage in any kind of employment. It would
appear from that comment that the claimant had never been evaluated
for rehabilitation purposes, and never engaged in employment as part
of a rehabilitation process. Section 1226(G) of the Act specifically prohibits the determination or adjudication of the "permanency of the
employee's total disability" while he is engaged in such a program, 5
and he is basically entitled to those services under Section 1226(E). 6 On
that account, the court should probably not have reached the issue. It
appears that very few advocates on either side of the controversy are
aware of this prohibition, but it may be expected that it will receive
increasing usage as the word spreads.
In another instance, the appellate court appears to have been suitably
stringent with respect to the standard for total and permanent disability,
but then relatively lenient with respect to the standard of "clear and
convincing evidence" in proving inability to engage in employment due
to substantial pain, with the result that the claimant was entitled to

3. 489 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
4. Id. at 448.
5. La. R.S. 23:1226(G) (1985) provides: "The permanency of the employee's total
disability under R.S. 23:1221(2) cannot be established, determined, or adjudicated while
the employee is employed pursuant to a rehabilitation program as provided in Subsection
(E) of this Section."
6. La. R.S. 23:1226(E) (1985).
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supplemental earnings benefits. 7 In still another decision during this term,
the appellate court appears to have interpreted the standard of "clear
and convincing evidence" with respect to total and permanent disability
properly, but it had to reverse the trial court to do so.'
These early returns are probably inconclusive. But they do suggest
that there is more room for maneuvering in the Act after the 1983
amendments than the drafters probably intended to leave. There are
more lines to be written in this chapter, so interested readers are advised
to stay tuned.
Tort Immunity of Principal
Running a close second to the total and permanent disability developments chronicled above were the developments with respect to the
tort immunity of the principal. There has been an opportunity in this
forum on several previous occasions to note the judicial uneasiness with
the immunity granted to a principal under the Act. There have been
no recent legislative changes, and thus the movement has all been in
how broadly the judiciary has been willing to construe the statutory
phrase requiring a showing of the "trade, business or occupation of
the principal," and how available the customary vehicle of summary
judgment is to deal with the question.
This term has proved to be no exception in that regard. Indeed,
there are those who would claim that there was a major development
during this term in the decision authored by now-retired Justice Blanche
in Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc.9
The case has an interesting jurisprudential background, having been
something of a judicial ping-pong ball as the third circuit and the supreme
court tested out their respective theories of the tort immunity. When
the case was first heard by the third circuit, ° it announced the continuation (and perhaps expansion) of an "oilfield exception" to a narrow
construction of the defense, in keeping with a series of Louisiana cases
over the years." The supreme court granted a writ and summarily
remanded the case' 2 with the instruction that the appellate court reconsider its decision in light of the opinion in Rowe v. Northwestern National

7. Gaspard v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986).
8. Price v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 492 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
9. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
10. 467 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
11. 1 W. Malone & A. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 126,
at 254-55, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
12. Berry v. Holston Well Serv., Inc., 474 So. 2d 1296 (La. 1985).
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Insurance Co.," the most recent pronouncement by the supreme court
on the subject.
On remand, the third circuit did not budge. It announced that it
had, in fact, considered carefully the predecessors of Rowe. In light of
the supreme court's specific order, it "considered" Rowe and distinguished it, declining to change its earlier ruling.' 4 Again, the supreme
court granted a writ. 5
This time, the supreme court took matters into its own hands and
reversed the summary judgment in favor of the alleged principal. 6 In
doing so, the court attempted to give some organization to its earlier
pronouncements on the subject. In the process, it announced a threelevel inquiry which must be conducted in order to reach the conclusion
that tort immunity should be conferred. In order for the alleged principal
to be held immune in tort, it must now clear all three of these analytical
hurdles.
The first inquiry is whether the contract work in which the tort
claimant was injured is "specialized or non-specialized."' 7 Under this
rubric, one is to consider whether the contract work requires a "degree
of skill, training, experience, education and/or equipment not normally
possessed by those outside the contract field."' 8 Apparently, this inquiry
is aimed at determining whether the contractor is an independent business
enterprise as opposed to an intermediary interposed to avoid compensation responsibility. These may not be synonymous, however. In theory,
and probably in practice, an entity might well be an independent business
enterprise, but yet not engaged in a specialty different from the work
which is a part of the alleged principal's business. In other words,
"independent" does not always equal "specialized."
If it is determined that the contract work is "specialized per se"
(a term not further defined), then the tort immunity of the principal
must be denied as a matter of law. If it is determined that the work
of the claimant's employer is not specialized, then one must reach the
second level of inquiry. This involves a comparison of the principal's
trade, business or occupation with the contract work, to determine
whether the work might be considered a part of that business. Generally
speaking, this tills familiar ground which has been discussed frequently
in the Louisiana cases. One would here inquire as to whether the work
is "routine and customary" and whether it is "regular and predictable."
Such an inquiry would customarily place extraordinary and non-recurring

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

471 So.
Berry v.
Berry v.
Berry v.
488 So.
Id.

2d 226 (La. 1985).
Holston Well Serv., Inc., 479 So. 2d 944 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
Holston Well Serv., Inc., 481 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1986).
Holston Well Serv., Inc., 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
2d at 938.
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repairs as well as new construction outside of the alleged principal's
business. At the same time, general maintenance and repair would be
predictable, regular and within the business of the principal. This second
inquiry also might focus upon whether the principal has the equipment
and personnel "capable" of performing the contract work. Finally, one
might consider whether the practice in the industry is to perform some
of this work with in-house employees, since this might suggest that the
fact that this particular task was contracted out by this alleged principal
is an aberration rather than a standard procedure.
Assuming that the determination is made that the contract work
could qualify as a part of the trade, business or occupation of the
principal, the final stage of the inquiry is whether the principal is actually
engaged in that trade, business or occupation at the time of the claimant's
injury. Obviously, the fact that the principal has the financial wherewithal
or expertise to enter a trade or business does not mean that it is in
fact in that business.
Those who see in Berry a radical change point particularly to this
"triple play" which the hopeful principal must pull off in order to
achieve tort immunity. There is undoubtedly some merit to the statement,
but the actual change in the law is probably exaggerated. The court
found the roots of its three-level inquiry in the appellate cases over the
years, so there is really nothing new in the substance of the test; rather,
there is a restatement of existing law. Certainly, the court said that it
had been shifting its "interpretive analysis regarding the statutory employer defense from one which favored a liberal application of the
doctrine to one which is more restrictive.' ' 9 There is little doubt that
this has been the trend. Berry is a continuation of that trend, but its
importance is more as a restatement of existing jurisprudence than as
a pronouncement of a new substantive test for tort immunity.
As with so many other statements on the subject of tort immunity
of the principal, the last word has certainly not been written. In due
course, the last word will be (and should be) legislative rather than
judicial.
Coverage of the Act
A very interesting question of coverage under the Act was resolved
during this term, in the context of the availability of the defense of
tort immunity. In Crabtree v. Carr,20 a young summer employee of a
country club was injured when the stove that he was using to cook
hamburgers exploded. It developed that the kitchen had been out of

19. Id.at 937.
20. 486 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
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service for a while and had very recently been reactivated. In order to
conserve funds, the directors of the club had pitched in to do some of
the repair work, and a leak in the stove in question had been repaired
by one of the directors. Apparently, the repair must not have been
completely successful.
The young employee brought a tort suit against the director, his
personal liability insurer and the club's insurer. The first two defendants
sought and were granted a peremptory exception of no cause, and
summary judgment in their favor, decreeing that they were not liable
in tort. The appellate court affirmed, properly observing that Louisiana
Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 23:1032 extends immunity to the employer
itself as well as its officers, directors, shareholders or partners. The
claimant had argued that a subsequent provision of Section 1032, which
denied immunity to such persons who were not engaged at the time of
the injury in the "normal course and scope" of their employment,
should be interpreted to permit a tort recovery, This has not been a
particularly fruitful approach in the past, 2' and the court was correct
in not departing from that jurisprudence.
The claimant had also argued that since the denial of the immunity
was phrased in terms of normal "employment," it could not apply to
a director, who is by definition not "employed" by the entity. The
court also rejected that argument, reasoning that the immunity should
be applicable when the director is engaged in the equivalent conduct to
employment, i.e., while engaged in the normal course and scope of his
duties to the entity. In the case of a social club operating on a tight
budget, those "duties" might well include the use of a little ordinary
elbow grease to reactivate a portion of the club's activities. On balance,
the retention of the possibility of a compensation remedy in such an
instance is probably a better protection for the workers than the somewhat ephemeral remedy in tort.
Dual Inquiry: In Course Of and Arising Out Of
Harris v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,2 is an example of a very expansive
view of the dual requirement that an injury occur in the course of
employment and arise out of it. In fact, it may well be beyond the
customary Louisiana position on the point, a position itself already
rather liberal. The case involved the so-called "neutral" risk of an
unusual weather phenomenon (flood).

21. See 2 W. Malone & A. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice §
364, at 156-57, in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
22. 485 So. 2d 965 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 488 SO. 2d 205 (La.
1986).
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The decedent was employed at the defendant's warehouse. On the
morning in question, torrential rains struck the New Orleans area, and
by mid-morning, more than a foot of water was already in the warehouse
itself. The employees were dismissed on account of the weather, but
the decedent chose to stick around for an unspecified amount of time
to see what the weather was going to do. Then, when the weather did
not break, he decided to leave, despite the fact that he seemed quite
anxious about doing so. He drove his vehicle out of the parking lot
and down a boulevard about a block, at which point it began to float.
Before he could be rescued, he was swept into a culvert and drowned.
There have not been very many Louisiana workers' compensation
cases involving acts of nature. In fact, there appear to have been only
three, and in each of these the employee could be considered squarely
in the course of his employment at the time the neutral risk occurred.23
Under those circumstances, it is understandable (though not necessarily
ineluctable) that there would be coverage under the Act.
The present matter goes somewhat beyond those cases. The worker
was no longer squarely in the course of his employment. He was not
on the premises, and he was arguably no longer within work hours,
having been dismissed at some unspecified time prior to his death. He
thus had a weak case on the in-the-course-of requirement, and concededly
no case at all on the arising-out-of requirement. Under the circumstances,
the proper conclusion would probably have been that the death was not
compensable.
The trial court had decided the case on the basis of the so-called
threshold doctrine, 24 which was probably not applicable in its customary
formulation. The court of appeal, however, sidestepped its application
by holding that the "hazard" of flooding "presented itself" at his place
of employment during the time of employment, concluding that it followed "elementarily, then, that this hazard arose out of and in the
course of employment. 2 5 While this reasoning permitted a sympathetic
result in this unfortunate case, it will almost certainly cause problems
in future cases.
The problems will arise because the court has abandoned a fairly
reliable and predictable method of resolving these difficult inquiries:
permitting a strong showing on one requirement to compensate for a

23. Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Corp., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942)
(tornado); Gasca v. Texas Pipeline Co., 2 La. App. 483 (2d Cir. 1925) (lightning);
Lebourgeois v. Lyon Lumber Co., 6 La. App. 216 (1st Cir. 1927) (lightning).
24. See 1 W. Malone & A. Johnson, supra note 11, § 169, at 349-55, for a typical
formulation and interpretive case. The exception permits coverage for an incident occurring
while the employee is proceeding to or from work at certain unusually hazardous places
which, although not on the employer's premises, are immediately adjacent to it.
25. Harris v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 485 So. 2d at 969.
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weak or non-existent showing on the other. In this instance, the court
has left the core of the in-the-course-of circle and has permitted a
showing in the fringe of the circle (at best) to compensation for a nonexistent showing on arising-out-of. If this should become an established
method of dealing with such problems, there will be no reliable guidelines
at all, and each case will have to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.
This will produce uncertain and inconsistent results which will only serve
to foment litigation.
Compensable Injury: Mental Disability of Suicide Witness
One of the most interesting, and potentially most important, deci26
sions during the term was Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equipment Co.
The claimant had been diagnosed as suffering from a multiple personality
disorder before the events that gave rise to her claim. She was, however,
working full time as a personal secretary to a corporate executive. On
the day in question, the executive committed suicide in his office by
shooting himself in the chest. Though fatally wounded, he survived for
approximately twenty minutes. During that entire time, the claimant
(having heard the shot) administered first aid to him and supervised the
obtaining of emergency assistance.
In the aftermath of the incident, the claimant continued to work
for the company, over the objections of her physician. Barely four
months later, she developed suicidal tendencies of her own, and finally
terminated her employment. She was subsequently hospitalized and ultimately filed suit in compensation and tort against the employer.
In keeping with developing trends in Louisiana jurisprudence, 27 the
appellate court had little difficulty in concluding that the claimant had
suffered a personal injury by "accident." In some ways, her claim was
stronger than others that had been accepted, since the precipitating
incident was easily identifiable and not a series of events over a long
period of time, which would make precise causal connection more difficult. 28 Apart from the relatively unusual fact that the precipitating
incident was the suicide of a fellow worker, there is very little difference
between her claim and that of a worker who witnesses the fall of a co29
worker and cannot return to the scene of the injury.

26. 482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
27. Ferguson v. HDE Inc., 264 La. 204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972); McDonald v.
International Paper Co., 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981); Taquino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
438 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (La. 1983). See
generally I W. Malone & A. Johnson, supra note 11, § 235 (Supp. 1986), at 64-66.
28. Consider especially in this regard McDonald v. International Paper Co., 406 So.
2d 582 (La. 1981).
29. See, e.g., Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315
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Although there obviously are very few similar cases in other jurisdictions, it appears that the decision in Davis is consistent with those
results.30 Given that the impact on the claimant was direct (she heard
the gunshot) and that the ultimate disability followed in relatively short
order, the decision seems entirely appropriate.
Problems of Successive Employment
The supreme court returned to the knotty problem of successive
employment and the allocation of responsibility among the various employers during this term. Several years ago, the court decided Carterv.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,3" holding that, in a contest between successive
employers over allocation of responsibility for compensation benefits,
the ultimate liability should rest with the last employer when it could
not demonstrate that the prior employment had been a causative factor.
The Carter decision did not address the related question of whether the
claimant had the right to pursue successive employers, and indeed whether
he was required to pursue the last employer.
In Gales v. Gold Bond Building Products, 2 the claimant sought
benefits on the basis of an asbestosis disability. He had worked in the
environment for some forty years for several employers, but sued only
Gold Bond, which had employed him for twenty-eight of the forty years.
At the close of his case, the trial court dismissed his suit because he
had failed to implead the last "causative employer," believing that Carter
required that result. The court of appeal affirmed.
Predictably, the supreme court reversed that conclusion. In other
contexts, the court has proven itself unwilling to force the employee
into a choice between several potentially liable employers. In a borrowed
employee situation, for example; the liability of the two employers is
solidary and the employee may sue either or both. 3 Since the issues
are not dissimilar, the result announced by the supreme court is not at
all surprising. It held that the obligation between the employers proven
to have a causative role in the disability is solidary, and the employee
may sue any combination of them he chooses. It follows that the trial

(1955); Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm., 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976) (worker
explained to co-worker how to operate machine, but then witnessed co-worker hurt herself
on same machine).
30. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330
N.E.2d 603 (1975) (very similar facts).
31. 415 So. 2d 174 (La. 1982).
32. 493 So. 2d 611 (La. 1986).
33. Humphreys v. Marquette Cas. Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (1958); Note,
Workmen's Compensation-Liability Under the Borrowed Servant Doctrine, 19 La. L.
Rev. 923 (1959).
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court's dismissal of the action because the plaintiff did not include the
last causative employer was erroneous.
Having thus resolved the issue presented in the case, the court went
on to a related issue which was apparently not presented: the allocation
of the responsibility among the various employers. Arguably, its discussion is dicta, as it actually was in Carter itself. That did not deter
the court, which announced the rule that as between the various employers, "the last obligor during whose employment the employee was
injuriously exposed to a cause of disease is liable for the whole compensation obligation. 3' 4 The court justified its rule on the basis of
convenience and promptness of payment, as well as achieving the highest
level of benefits for the worker (on the assumption that his last job
would have been the best-paying job).
With all respect, the court may have exaggerated the importance of
convenience. While it is true that proof of causation and allocation may
be difficult, why should we not leave the avenue open to the employers?
We have taken care of the problem of the claimant, who need no longer
be delayed by any requirement that he properly allocate the causative
role of each employer before he can recover. In many instances, the
various employers may see the futility of trying to allocate the responsibility short of litigation or by settlement if there is litigation. But in
the instance in which the last employer has convincing proof that the
loss should lie elsewhere, why deny him that relief? The ruling in Gales
may have an unintended result. It may cause employers from whom an
employee seeks employment to decline to employ him if he has had a
long period of employment with another employer in a risky environment. To say that these matters will even out over time among the
various employers is little solace to an employer who encounters only
one such situation. His safest line of defense is to employ a younger
worker, who may be less experienced, but who would be beginning his
career with that employer rather than bringing an industrial history with
him.
Increasing Use of Modification of Judgments
Two decisions during this term demonstrate an interesting development in the use of La. R.S. 23:1331 (as it read prior to the 1983
amendments 35), which permits the modification of judgments if the in-

34. 493 So. 2d at 616.
35. Prior to amendment in 1983, La. RS. 23:1331 permitted a modification of an
earlier judgment when it was shown that the "incapacity of the employee has been
subsequently diminished or increased." After the 1983 amendments, the section simply
provides that an earlier judgment "may be modified" without stating any particular basis
for the modification.
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capacity of the claimant has diminished or increased. In each case, the
claimant had initially been adjudged to be entitled to total and permanent
disability benefits, and the employer subsequently sought to have the
benefits decreased because of an alleged change in the capacity of the
employee. In Dement v. InternationalPaper Co,,36 there was evidence
that the claimant had worked frequently during the three-year period
following the judgment, and had in fact been working at the same type
of job that he had held prior to his injury. The trial court had denied
any modification in the prior judgment on the basis that the claimant
could not return to the same job (the pre-1975 standard). The appellate
court reversed, noting that this was the wrong standard, but held that
the facts showed that even that standard had not been satisfied. The
appellate court also held that the claimant was not even partially disabled
any longer, and thus relieved the defendant for the obligation of paying
any further compensation benefits.
The decision in Wheat v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Construction Corp.1
is similar, though less drastic in the reduction which was ordered. The
claimant had received the benefit of the "odd lot" doctrine in the first
trial, on the basis that he would have had to work in substantial pain.
The trial court rejected the modification requested by the employer
because it determined that the physical disability was greater than it
had been. The appellate court reversed, noting that physical disability
was not the only issue since the claimant had earlier been classified as
totally disabled due to substantial pain. Finding that the pain had
diminished, and that the worker had been steadily employed since the
first judgment, the appellate court held that he was entitled to benefits
based on permanent partial disability (supplemental earnings benefits
under the 1983 amendments).
The moral for employers and carriers seems clear. Section 1331
should be kept constantly in mind, and the possibility of an adjustment
should be pursued if the facts warrant. It follows that the carrier or
the employer will have to exercise some kind of periodic review of the
claimant's physical condition and work situation in order to make such
an adjustment effort feasible.
Role of Co-Employee Negligence in Tort Suit
38
is in many
The decision in Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers
respects the most interesting of the term from an academic standpoint.
The plaintiff was injured on the job and was paid compensation by his

36. 479 So. 2d 993 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
37. 479 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
38. 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 So. 2d 1330, 1331
(La. 1986).
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employer (no compensation carrier is mentioned). He brought a tort
action against two other entities who employed workers on the scene
at the time. The employer intervened. The two defendants brought thirdparty demands against each other and against the employer. They also
alleged the negligence of the plaintiff in an attempt to diminish his
recovery.
The third-party demand against the employer was dismissed on an
exception of no cause of action on the strength of the decision in
LeJeune v. Highlands Insurance Co.39 Thus the employer remained in
the case only as an intervenor. The trial judge, apparently sitting without
a jury, ultimately assessed the percentages of fault as 20% to one of
the two defendants, 40% to the other and 40% to the employer. No
fault was assigned to the plaintiff. But when the ultimate judgment was
entered, the court reduced plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of fault
which had been assigned to his employer, i.e. to a co-employee. At the
same time, the court declined to reduce the amount to be paid to the
employer on the intervention for compensation benefits paid, thus permitting the employer to recover these benefits entirely despite the negligence of one of its employees.
On appeal, plaintiff complained of the 40% reduction in his tort
recovery; the defendants complained that in light of the assignment of
fault to an employee of the employer, the amount awarded on the
intervention should have been diminished as well. The relief granted by
the court of appeal was favorable to the plaintiff, but not to the
defendants.
On the first issue, the appellate court reasoned that nothing in the
Act suggested that the tort recovery of the claimant should be diminished
by the negligence of a co-employee. Moreover, such a result seems
inconsistent with the basic compromise underlying the Act. Furthermore,
there is also no authority in the basic principles of comparative negligence
for such a reduction. If plaintiff had been assessed some percentage of
the fault, then his recovery should have been diminished. But the fact
that someone else, for whom plaintiff bears no responsibility in law (a
co-employee), was negligent should not affect his recovery in any way.
Thus the court reversed the 40% reduction in the plaintiff's award and
held that the recovery should be paid by the two defendants in the ratio
assigned to them (2:1).
The second issue is much closer, and demonstrates again the problems inherent in an Act originally written against a backdrop of contributory negligence and now playing against a stage setting of comparative
negligence. The writer has earlier had occasion in this forum 40 and
39. 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974).
40. Johnson, Developments in the Law 1984-1985-Workers' Compensation, 46 La.
L. Rev. 723, 729-30 (1986).
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elsewhere"' to comment on this phenomenon and to suggest that the
result sought by these defendants would not be inappropriate. But understandably, the appellate court felt that the matter should be dealt
with by the legislature rather than the judiciary. The court noted that
there had been no departure from the decision in Vidrine, and that it
was powerless to achieve what the defendants felt would be a "fair"
treatment in the absence of any legislative authority to do so. Accordingly, the court declined the invitation by the defendants to diminish
the award on the intervention by the percentage of negligence of the
co-employee of the plaintiff.
Along the way, the appellate court dropped a rather broad hint that
because of the "broader" nature of the "power and role" of the supreme
court, the defendants might find some relief there. The supreme court
ignored the hint, denying a writ request by each of the two defendants,
2
with two dissents.4
The problem probably will not just fade away. Now that the trial
courts are becoming familiar with comparative negligence and the convenience that it brings to many disputes, tort suits in which there is a
workers' compensation interplay cannot remain uninfluenced by the
principle. As noted in this forum last year, there has already been
legislative action to provide for the diminution of the employer's recovery
by the percentage of negligence of the injured employee who is the tort
claimant.4 But since the plaintiff in Franklin was held to be blameless,
the amendment had no application. No doubt the decision will suggest
to the legislature that the problem might be ripe for further consideration.
Retaliatory Discharge Standards: Insurance Coverage
The relatively recent enactment of sanctions for retaliatory discharge
(firing due to filing of compensation claim, or refusal to re-hire on that
same basis) continues to produce a flow of jurisprudence. During this
term, two decisions are worthy of note. The first is Guye v. International
Paper Co." The second circuit in that decision declined to follow some
earlier appellate opinions to the effect that the retaliatory discharge
provision 5 was "remedial" in nature. Rather, noting that the statute
called for the employer found guilty of violating it to pay a fine
equivalent to a year's earnings, the court held that the statute was penal
in nature and should be strictly construed. This seems entirely correct;

41. 2 W. Malone & A. Johnson, supra note 21, § 371, at 191-206.
42. Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, 481 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (La. 1986) (Dennis
and Lemmon, JJ., dissenting).
43. Johnson, supra note 40.
44. 488 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
45. La. R.S. 23:1361 (1985).
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but even under a strict construction, the court held that the employer
had in fact discharged the claimant because he asserted a compensation
claim.
The second decision is potentially much more important than the
first. In Vallier v. Oilfield Construction Co.,4" the third circuit faced
squarely the question of whether an award under the retaliatory discharge
provision was required to be covered under a compensation policy issued
to the employer. Reviewing a summary judgment which had been granted
to the carrier denying that there was such coverage, the court held that
neither the policy itself nor the Act required that there be such coverage.
Accordingly, it affirmed the summary judgment below.
The court noted that a specific endorsement to the policy provided
that there was no coverage for "fines or penalties" imposed on the
insured for "failure to comply with the requirements of any workmen's
compensation law." Further, it observed that the language of Section
1361 referred to its sanction as a "civil penalty." Therefore, it concluded
that the policy in question intended to exclude coverage. This logic is
irrefutable, but the inquiry could not end there.
The Louisiana statute falls in the category of compensation statutes
which contain an "entire liability" provision. In our case, it is La. R.S.
23:1162, which provides in pertinent part that no policy "of insurance
against liability under this Chapter" may be issued "unless the policy
covers the entire liability of the employer." The underlying purpose of
the provision is to assure the employee that he does not have to litigate
his compensation claim twice, once against the employer and later against
the carrier. If the compensation statutes make the employer liable to
the claimant, then there is insurance coverage for that liability. The
provision also offers a small measure of solace to the employer, who
knows that if he is liable to his employee "under this Chapter," then
he has insurance coverage for his liability when he pays his premium
to the carrier.
It is true that this scheme was not devised with penalties for retaliatory discharge in mind. But adherence to the strict letter of the
enactment would nonetheless require a different result from that reached
by the court. The liability of the employer for retaliatory discharge is
a liability "under this Chapter" and on that basis alone, there should
be coverage. But even beyond that, there are good policy reasons to
support such a conclusion. The retaliatory discharge section is nothing
other than a way to be sure that the employee receives the benefits to
which the law entitles him, without retribution. It is thus part and parcel
of the compensation Act and should not be divorced from it.

46.

483 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 So. 2d 734 (La. 1986).
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There will be those who say that the competing public policy that
one should not be able to insure against his own intentional misconduct
is stronger than any policy behind Section 1162 and should prevail. The
writer is inclined to disagree; but if the former policy is to prevail, the
Act should be amended to make that absolutely clear. There is precedent
for such a provision. When the legislature enacted revised penalty provisions in 1983, it specifically provided that if the court determines that
it was the employer rather than the insurer who was responsible for
the delay in payment, then the insurance policy could not be interpreted
to cover the penalty. 47 There will be no difficulty in drafting a similar
provision with respect to the retaliatory discharge provision, but the best
reading of the present law is that there should be coverage.
Even if there is an amendment, caution should be exercised. The
"entire liability" concept is a good one and has considerable acceptance
in the country. Erosion of it in any way should be carefully scrutinized.
Miscellaneous Procedural Matters
Certain procedural developments require very brief comment. A
group of four cases dealt with the consequences of the failure of either
the employee or the employer to reject the recommendation of the
Director once a dispute has been submitted to him. The statute provides
that if a party does not respond in some way within thirty days of
receipt of the Director's recommendation, he is presumed to have ac-

cepted

it.48

In Henry v. Simmons Family Investments, Inc. ,'49 the claimant sought
compensation for two different incidents. With respect to one, the
Director had issued a recommendation (apparently unfavorable to the
employee) to which the employee did not respond within the thirty-day
period. The court held that his failure to respond within the delay period
caused a peremptive period to expire, leaving him without any ability
to reject the recommendation and file a lawsuit to overturn it. In the
second case, 50 the failure to respond was detrimental to the employer.
The claim had been submitted to the Director but neither party responded
to his recommendation within the thirty-day period. His recommendation
was that temporary total disability benefits be paid to the claimant.
Some time thereafter, the employer stopped payments. The claimant
resorted to the district court, but his suit was dismissed on an exception
of prematurity. The court held that the suit was not subject to dismissal
on that basis, since the employer was presumed to have accepted the
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recommendation of the Director, and the provisions relative to attachment of a certificate of rejection were inapplicable.
The remaining two cases take up a suggestion made in this forum
immediately after the 1983 amendment" relative to the situation in which
the claimant fails to reject the Director's recommendation timely, but
then seeks relief in the district court. Rather than hold that the claimant
is now without remedy altogether, the third circuit held in Rich v.
Geosource Wireline Services, Inc. 2 and Arthur v. Union Underwear
Co.53 that the initiation of litigation under such circumstances should
be considered an effort to have the recommendation of the Director
reviewed under La. R.S. 23:1331. That section permits a review, first
by the Director and then by the appropriate district court, when more
than six months has elapsed from the initial determination. In each of
the decided cases, the six-month period to permit review had elapsed,
but the claimant had gone to district court first rather than back to
the Director. It followed that the litigation was premature. But the
claimant could start in the right place (the Director's office) and proceed
from there. The decisions seem fair, and make the best of a rather
difficult situation: an uneasy relationship between an administrative agency
and the judicial system.
Francosiv. South Central Bell Telephone Co.54 dealt with the related
issue of the applicable prescriptive periods following a recommendation
by the Director. Under the 1983 amendments which established the Office
of the Director, a claimant's time period for instituting litigation if
dissatisfied with the recommendation of the Director was fixed at sixty
days from the receipt of the recommendation or the period allowed
under La. R.S. 23:1209 (the normal prescriptive period), whichever is
longer. The claimant permitted more than sixty days to elapse from the
recommendation, and more than a year from the latest date at which
she might have been considered disabled. Since she was never paid any
benefits, the one-year period established the latest date upon which she
could sue. She did not, and her action was held to be prescribed.
There were also decisions during this term dealing with the revised
provisions on penalties and attorney's fees. The 1983 amendment substantially changed the penalties provisions, and in particular apparently
eliminated the standard of "arbitrary and capricious" behavior of the
employer or insurer as a prerequisite for the award of penalties. The
amended provisions purport to be more objective, tying the award of

51. Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the Workers'
Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669, 693 (1984).
52. 490 So. 2d 1165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
53. 492 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
54. 492 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
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penalties into specific time periods after knowledge of injury and loss
of wages. If the delay period is exceeded with that knowledge, then the
employer owes the penalty unless it demonstrates that the non-payment
"results from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no
control" 55 or unless the right to benefits "has been reasonably controverted" by the insurer or employer.
The last phrase might be troublesome, since it implies that the
objection to benefits might have had to precede the non-payment. The
cases do not appear to be headed in that direction, however. In Chelette
v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance, Inc.,56 the court implied
that a reasonable basis for some subsequent objection to benefits will
suffice-a standard which is not all that different from the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard. In Theriot v. American Employees Insurance
Co.,17 the same appellate court adhered to that standard, but found
that the employer did not have such a reasonable basis for objection
and imposed penalties. The 1983 amendments did not delete the "arbitrary and capricious" standard from the provisions for award of
attorney's fees. The Theriot court noted the difference, but found that
this arguably more stringent standard had nonetheless been satisfied and
affirmed the award of attorney's fees in the case before it.
There is some confusion in Walker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co." about the standard which the court applied. The injury had occurred in 1977, and litigation on the matter was filed in 1983 prior to
the amendments of that year which altered the penalty provisions. In
determining an issue of penalties and attorney's fees, the court recited
the post-1983 language, but then held that the insurer had behaved in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. Thus it seems that the court applied
the pre-1983 standard. The opinion, however, raises the interesting question of whether the post-1983 standard (assuming it is different from
the pre-1983 standard) should be applied to injuries arising prior to the
effective date of the amendments. For the sake of simplicity, it would
be very easy to say that they should not. All of the rights and duties
of the parties could be fixed according to the law at the time of injury.
Moreover, such a determination would be in keeping with the clear
provisions of La. R.S. 1:2, which states that no section of the Revised
Statutes is retroactive unless expressly stated to be.
However, there are some indications during this term that certain
of the provisions changed in 1983 might be applied to cases arising
prior to the enactment. In Wells v. K & B, Inc.,59 the court applied
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certain 1983 and 1984 amendments concerning settlement of tort actions
to a suit pending prior to their enactment, but settled after they were
effective. The changes were held to be "procedural" in nature. It seems
difficult to call the penalty provisions "procedural," but that is not
beyond the realm of possibility.
An old problem reared its head during this term, and the resolution
of it in the claimant's favor demonstrates the importance of meticulous
attention to the matter of settlement.60 The claimant was awarded a
judgment for total and permanent disability benefits which, if paid out
over time, would have amounted to approximately $250,000.00. The
judgment became final. Some months thereafter, the parties agreed to
a "Joint Stipulation, Consent Judgment and Order of Dismissal" under
which the claimant was to b e paid $70,000.00. The document recited
that there was a "continuing dispute" between the parties over the
duration and extent of disability and that the parties wished to "compromise and settle" the dispute between them.6 1 The trial judge approved
the document.
Subsequently, the claimant brought a lawsuit alleging that the document was in fact only a lump sum settlement and not a compromise;
that the sum paid was discounted at a rate greater than 8% in violation
of the Act; 62 and that he was thus entitled to a penalty of 150% of
the properly discounted sum. The trial court awarded the penalty of
some $129,000.00 and the court of appeal affirmed that result. The
appellate court observed that the judgment awarding some $250,000.00
in benefits over time was final, and that no effort had been made by
the defendant to seek a modification under La. R.S. 23:1331. Though
the parties recited that there was a dispute, the court held that in fact
there was none and the mere recitation that there was could not alter
the state of the record. A word to the wise should be sufficient: beware
the improperly discounted lump sum settlement.
One final procedural matter should be noted, even though there
does not appear to have been a decision on the point during this term.
There seems to be a belief in some quarters that if a claim arising after
the 1983 amendments enters litigation, any compromise of the dispute
thereafter either can be or must be submitted to the district court having
jurisdiction over the matter, and not to the Office of the Director.
While this approach has some logic to it (assuming it were true that
somehow the Director is divested of jurisdiction entirely once litigation
is initiated), there is one serious obstacle to such an approach. The Act
does not appear to authorize it. Section 1272,63 which governs such
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matters, provides simply that a "compromise settlement agreement entered into by the parties . . . shall be presented to the director for
approval. . . ." It does not provide exception for matters in litigation.
The fact that some district judges may be approving such compromise
agreements without their being submitted to the Director is of course
of no significance whatsoever. The risk is that in an exceptional case,
a claimant might later seek to annul the compromise agreement or claim
that it was an unauthorized lump sum settlement and seek the 150%
penalty. There is venerable authority for such a proposition 64 and the
preceding paragraphs reveal the danger in such an approach. While
returning to the Director for approval of a compromise when the parties
are before the district court may seem cumbersome and inconvenient,
the Act appears rather clear on the point.

64. Fluitt v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry., Co., 187 La. 87, 174 So. 163, cert. denied,
302 U.S. 704, 58 S. Ct. 24 (1937).

